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SITUATION

III

ARMED MERCHANT VESSELS

States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral.
Some of the merchant vessels of states X and Y are armed
and some are unarmed.
State A admits armed merchant vessels to its ports on
the same terms as other merchant vessels.
State. B excludes all ar1ned merchant vessels from its
ports.
State C ad1nits armed merchant vessels to its ports
under the same rules as vessels of war and admits unarn1ed merchant vessels as in the t-ime of peace.
State X protests against the regulations of states A
and C.
State Y protests against the regulations of states B
and C.
How far are the protests valid~
SOLUTION

Practice and opinion since 1914 afford so1ne support for
the position of each neutral and for the protest of each
belligerent, but the position of state C seems to be gaining
support. The whole situation shows the need of clear
determination of the status of armed merchant vessels.
NOTES

General.-During and since the World \V ar the status
of armed merchant vessels has been a subject of much
difference of opinion. It has been referred to in many
diplomatic notes and in proclamations. There were
armed merchant vessels in early times. The prevalence
of piracy and the. use of privateers made arming seem
necessary for safety. Slave trading was made pira'cy by
a British act of Parliarnent in 1825. Smuggling caused
1802--29----6
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many complications at about this period and earlier. In
some ren1ote coasts there was little protection for vessels
other than such force as they might themselves muster.
The reasons for arming were mainly for self-protection
in time of peace and in time of war before privateering
vvas declared abolished in 1856.
Early polioy of the United' StaJtes.-In 1797 President
Adams said he enter'tained no doubtof the policy and propriety of permitting our vessels to employ
Ineans of defense while engaged in a lawful foreign commerce. It
ren1ains for Congress to prescribe such regulations as will enable
our seafaring citizens to defend themselves against violations of
the law of nations, and at the san1e time restrain them from
committing acts of hostility against the powers at war.

An act of June 25, 1798 (1 Stat. L. 572), provided that
an A1nerican merchant vessel " may oppose and defend
itself against any search, restraint, or seizure which shall
be attempted upon such vessel."
Later legislation provided that: ,
The Conuuander and crew of any Inerchant vessel of the United
States, owned wholly, or in part, by a citizen thereof, 1nay oppose
and defend against any aggression, search, restraint, depredation,
or seizure, which shall be attempted upon such vessel, or upon
any other vessel so owned, by the commander or crew of any
anned vessel whatsoever, not being a public armed vessel of smne
nation in amity with the United States, and may subdue and capture the san1e; and n1ay also retake any vessel so owned which
may have been captured by the commander or crew of any such
anned vessel, and send the san1e into any port of the United
States. (Act Mar. 3, 1819, 3 Stat. p. 513, temporary act till next
session of Congress; made pennanent by act Jan. 30, 1823, 3
Stat. p. 721.)

Declaration of Paris, 1856.-The Declaration of Paris,
1856, provided "Privateering is and remains abolished"
with the idea that privately armed vessels would no
longer be used in war. Subsidized vessels, volunteer
fleets, etc., were at first regarded with suspicion but later
were generally accepted.
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of United States, late nineteenth, centuJ·y.-After the Declaration of Paris, 1856, the United States
. was particularly careful to explain that the laws did noL
forbid arming " solely for the purpose of defense an< L
self-protection." There was, however, 1nuch concern
.test vessels should be armed in the United States ancl
..subsequQntly engage in filibustering expeditions, and
armed vessels -vvere r'equired to give bonds to double
their value in order to discourage such activities, showIng that arming was not regarded as essential to safety
of the vessel. The attitude of other states had bePn
somewhat similar in regard to arming.
Pre-tdar British attit~tde.-ln his speech upon the
naval estimate on Wednesday, March 26, 1913, Mr.
Churchill after speaking more particularly of the r material of the Navy and of protection against airships
said:
I turn to one aspect of trade protection which requires special
reference. It was made cle·ar at the Second I-Ia gue Conferenee
that certain of the Great Powers have reserved to themselves
the right to convert merchant stea1ners h1to cruisers, not 1nerely
in national harbours, but if necessary on the high seas. There
is now good reason to believe that a considerable number of
foreign merchant steamers may be rapidly converted into armed
ships by the mounting of guns. The sea-borne trade of' the world
follows well-marked routes, upon nearly all of which the tonnage
of the British Mercantile lVIarine largely predo1ninates. Our foodcarrying liners and vessels carrying raw material following
these trade routes would, in certain contingencies, meet foreign
vessels armed and equipped in the 1nanner described. If the
British ships had no armament, they would be at the mercy
of any foreign liners carrying one effective gun and a few rounds
of ammunition. It would be obviously absurd to meet the contingency of considerable numbers of foreign armed merchant
cruisers on ~he high seas by building an equal nu1nber of cruisers.
That would expose this country to an expenditure of money to
meet a particular danger altogether di.sproportiona te to the
expense caused to any foreign Power in creating tbat danger.
Hostile cruisers, wherever they are found, will be covered and
met by British ships of war, but the proper reply to an aqned
merchantman is another merchantman armed in her own defence.
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'l'his is the position to which the Admiralty have felt it necessar;v to draw the attention of leading shipowners. We have
felt justified in pointing out to them the danger to life and
property which would be incurred if their vessels were totally
incapable of offering any defense to an attack. The shipowners
have responded to the Admiralty invitation with cordiality, and
substantial progress has been 1nade in the direction of meeting
it by preparing as a defensive 1neasure to equip a number of
first-class British liners to repel the attack of armed foreign
n1erchant cruisers. Although these vessels have, of course, a
wholly different status frOin that of the regularly cOinmissioned
Inerchant cruisers, such as those we obtain under the Cunard
agreement. the Admiralty have felt that the greater part of the
cost of the necessary equipn1ent should not fall upon the owners,
and we have decided, therefore, to lend the necessary· guns, to
supply annuunition, and to provide for the training of 1nembers
of the ship's con1pany to for1n the guns' crews. The owners
on their part are paying the cost of the necessary . structural
conversion. which is not great. · The British :Mercantile Marine
will, of course, have the protection of the Royal Navy under
all possible circun1stances, but it is 9bviously impossible to
guarantee individual vessels from attack when they are scattered
on their voyages all over the world. No one can pretend to
view these n1easures ·without regret, or without hoping that the
period of retrogression all over the world which has rendered them
necessary Inay be succeeded by days of broader international confidence and agree1nent than those through which we are now passing. (Parliainentary Debates, Commons [1913], vol. 50, p. 1776.)

On June 10, 1913, Mr. Churchill (First Lord o£ the
Achnira.lty) said :
The House will perhaps allow me to take the opportunity of
clearing up a misconception which appears to be prevalent.
1\'Ierchant vessels carrying guns may belong to one or other of two
totally different classes. The first class is that of anned merchant cruisers which on the outbreak of war would be comnlissionecl under the 'Vhite Ensign and would then be indistinguishable in statu~ and control from men-of-war. In this
class belong the M au1retania and Lusitanl.a. The second class
consists of n1erchant vessels, which would (unless specially taken
up by the Achniralty for any purpose) remain merchant vessels
in war, without any change of status, but have been equipped
by their owners, with Ad1niralty assistance, with a defensive
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.a rmament in order to exercise their right of beating off a ttack.
(Parliamentary Debates, Commons [1913], vol. 53, p. 1431. )

On June 11, 1913, in reply to a question as to whether
ships ·were " equipped for defense only and not
for attack," Mr. Churchill said:

m~rchant

Surely these ships will be quite valueless for the purposes of
attacking anned vessels of any kind. What they are serviceable
for is to defend themselves against the attack of o~her vessels of
their own standing. (Parlian1entary Debates, Conunons, 1913,
Vol. 53, p. 1599.)

Again on ~larch 17, 1914, Mr. Churchill, speaking for
the British Government, said of armed 1nerchant ships:

* * * by the end of 1914-15 seventy ships will have been so
(two 4.7 guns) armed. They are anned solely for defensive
purposes. The guns are mounted in the stern and can only fire
on a pursuer. * * * They are not allowed to fight \VLh any
ships of war. * * * They are, however, thoroughly capable of
self-de.fense against an enemy's armed n1erchantman. (ParliaInentary Debates, Commons, 1914, vol. 59, 1925.)
Late Ger1nan attitude.-The counselor of the Ger1nan
Imperial Navy Department, Dr. George Schran1, said in
1913:
Self-defense is defined as a defense against any unla '\Yful encroachment upon a legal right. (Das Prisenrecht, p. 308.)
It is doubtful in particular cases in what the criterion of
forcible resistance consis~s, especially whether preparations, e. g.:
equipment of the vessel with suitable arma1nent, would entail
the legal consequences of resistance. This question 111 ust be answered in the negative. Preparations or the ·n1ere atte1npt to
escape do no~ constitute in the1nselves a forcible defense; they
do not encroach upon the legal rights of the belligerent. (Ibid.
p. 310.)

E arrly British motes on etrr?ned rnerchant vessels ·in
World lVar.-Great Britain declared war against Germany on August 4, 1914. On the same day the British
charge in Washington sent to the Secretary of State a
comn1unication in. regard to the arming of merchant vessels in neutral waters, and other notes follo,ved.

'
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The British Gha1"'ge to the Secretary of State

(No. 252.)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

1Vashi.n,gton, AU.fJUS't 1,, 1911,.
SrR: In view of the state· of war now existing between Great

Britain and Ge-rmany, I have the honour, under instructions from
His :Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, t<T
make the following communication to you in respe·ct to the arming
of any merchant vessels in neutral wate·rs.
As you are• aware it is recognized that a n eutral Governrnent is
bound t o use due diligence~ to prohibit its subje·cts or citizens front
the building and fitting out to order of belligerent vessels intended
for warlike purposes and also to prevent the departure of any ·
such vessels from its jurisd:ction. The starting point for the universal recognition of this principle was the thr ee r ules formulated
in Article VI of the Treaty between Great Britain and the United
States of America for the amicable settlement of all causes of
differences betwe3n the two countries, signed at 'Vashington on
l\1ay 8, 1871. These r ules, which His :M ajesty's Governrnent and
the United States Government agreed to observe as between thern.
"
selves iJ?- future, are as follows:
"A neutral Government is bound" First. To use due· diligence· to prevent the fitting out, arming,
or equipping, within its jurisdiction/ of any vessel which it has
reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on
war aga 1nst a Power with which it is at peace; and also to use
like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of
any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such
vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within
such jurisdiction to warlike use.
" Secondly. Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make
use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against
the other, or for. the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of
milita,r y supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.
" Thirdly. To exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters,
and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any
violation of the foregoing obligations and duties."
The above rules may be said to have acquired the force of generally recognized rules of International Law, and the first of
them is reproduced almost textually, in Article VIII of The
Hague Convention Number 13 of 1907 concerning the Rights and,
Duties of Neutral Powers in case of Maritime 'Varfare, the
principles of which have been agreed to by practically every
maritime State·.
It is known, however, that Germany, with whmn Great Britain
is at war, favours the policy of converting her merchant vessels
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into armed ships on the High Seas, and it is probable, therefore, that attempts will be made to e·quip and despatch merchantmen for such conversion from the ports of the United States.
It is probable that, even if the final completion of the measures
to fit out merchantmen to act as cruisers. may have· to be effected
on the High Seas, most of the preliminary arrangements will
have been made before· the vessels leave port, so that the warlike
purpose to which they are to be put after leaving neutral waters
1nust be more or less manifest before their departure.
In calling your attention to the above 1ncntloned. "Rules of
the Treaty of vVashington" and The I--Iague Convention, I have
the honour to state that His Majesty's Govern1nent will accordingly hold the United States Govern1nent responsible for any
damages to British Trade or shipping, or injury to British interests generally, which may be caused by such vessels having been
equipped at, or departing fron1, United States ports.
I have, etc.,
CoLVILLE BARCLAY.

(Spec. Sup. A1n. Jour. Int. Law, vol. 9, July, 1915, p. 222.)

The British Charge d'Affaires to the Secretary of State

(No. 259.)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

lVashington, August 9, 1914.

SrR : With reference to 1ny note No. 252 of the 4th instant, I
have the honour to inform you that I have no'v receive cl instructions from Sir Edward Grey to 1nake a further communication to
you in explanation of the position taken by His Majesty's Government in regard to the question of anned merchantlnen.
As you are no doubt aware, a certain nun1ber of British
1nerchant vessels are armed, but this is a precautionary 1neasure
adopted solely for the purpose of' defence, which. under existing
rules of international law, is the right of all 1nerchant vessels
when attacked.
According to British rule, British merchant vessels can not be
converted into men-of-war in any foreign port, for the reason
that Great Britain does not adn1it the right of any Powel' to
do this on the High Seas. The duty of a neutral to intern or
order the immediate departure of belligerent vessels is limitecl
to actual and potential men-of-war, and in the opinion of IIis
Majesty's Governme~t, there can therefore be no right on the
part of neutral Governments to intern British armed Ine i·chant
vessels, which can not be converteu into 1nen-of-war on the
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High Seas, nor to require them to land their guns before
proceeding to sea.
On the other hand, the German Government have consistently
clain1ed the right of conversion on the High Seas, and His
:M ajesty's Government therefore 1naintain their claim that vessels which are adapted for conversion and · under German rules
n1ay be converted into men-of-war on the High Seas should be
interned in the absence of binding assurances, the responsibility
for which must be assumed by the neutral Government concerned,
that they shall not be so converted.
I have, etc.,
COLVILLID BARCLAy.
(Ibid. p. 223.)
THE BRITISH CHARGE TO THE SECRETARY

OF

STATE·

BRITISH EMBASSY,
Wa·shiJngton,

A'll~gust

12, 1914.

SIR : With reference to 1ny notes Nos. 252 and 259 of August 4
and August 9, respectively, stating and explaining the position
taken up by His Majesty's Government in regard to the question
of armed merchantmen, I have the honor to state that I have now
been infonned by Sir Edward Grey that exactly similar instructions were at the same thne issued by him to His Majesty's
representatives in practically all neutral countries to address the
san1e com1nunications to the respective Governn1ents to which they
were accredited.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.
(Ibid. p. 224.)

Reply of th1e United StaJtes.-The United States in a
note of August 19, 1914, reviewed briefly the British
notes and showed that France and Russia had upheld the
right of conversion on the high seas as 'vell as Austria
and Germany, while Great Britain and Belgium had
opposed this right at The Hague Conference in 1907.
Great Britain had later 1naintained that there was no
rule of international law on the subject. Referring to
the last clause of the British ·note of August 4, 1914, in
·which the responsibility of the United States ·was
declared, the American note said :
It see1ns obvious therefore that by neither the terms · nor the
interpretation of the provisions of the treaties on this point is th~
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United States bound to assu1ne the attitude of an insurer. Consequently the United States disclaims as a correct statement of
its responsibility the assertion in your note that " His l\1aj.esty's
Govern1nent will accordingly hold the United States Govern1nent
responsible for any dmnages to British trade or shipping, or injury
to British interests generally, which may be caused by such vessels having been equipped at, or departing from, United States
ports." (Ibid. p. 228.)

BTitislt asstl?"aJnces, 191,4.-Sir Cecil Spr{ng-Rice wrote
to the Secretary o£ State, August 25, 1914:
( N 0. 289.)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

1Vashington, A,ugust 25, 1914.
'Vith reference to Mr. Barclay's notes Nos. 2.52 and 259 of the
4th and 9th of August. respectively, fully explaining the position
taken up by His Majesty's Government in regard to the question
of armed merchanti~en . I have the honour, in view of the fact that
a number of British anned 1nerchantmen will now be visiting
United States ports, to reiterate that the anning of British merchantmen is solely a precautionary measure adopted for the purpose of defen~e against attack frmn hostile craft.
I have at the .sa1ne time be~m instructed by His l\fajesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to give· the United
States Government the fullest assurances that British n1erchant
vessels will never be used for purposes of attack, that they are
merely peaceful traders armed only for defence, that they will
never fire unless first fired upon, and that they will never under
any circumstances attack any vessel. (Ibid., p. 230.)

To this the State Department replied as follo\vs:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Wash.ingto,n, August 29, 1914.
I have the honor to ackno,vledge the receipt of your note· of the
25th instant in which, referring to previous correspondence·, you
state that, in view of the· fact that a number of British armed
merchantmen will now be visiting United States ports, you desire
to reite·rate· that the arming of British me·rchantmen is solely · a
precnutionary me·asure· adopted for the· purpose of defence against
attack from hostile craft. Yon add that you have been instructed
by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State· for Fore-ign Affairs
to give the Government of the United States the fullest assurances that British merchant vessels will never be used for purposes of attack, that the,y are· merely p;eaceful traders armed only
for rlefence, that they will never fire, unless first fired upon, and

I
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that they will never under any circumstances attack any vessel.
(Ibid. p. 230.)

The Ad~t~c, armed with four guns, and the M errion,
armed with six guns, had entered. ports of the United
States and the American Government foresaw complications in maintaining neutrality and so notified British
authorities. The British ambassador states on September
4, 1914:
I have now received a reply from Sir Edward Grey, in which
he informs me that IIis 1\Iajesty's Government hold the view that
it is not in accordance with neutrality and inteTnational law to
detain in neutral ports. 1nerchant vessels ar1ned with purely defensive armaments. But in view of the fact that the· United
States Governn1ent is detaining arn1ed merchant vessels prepared
for offensive warfare, and in order to avoid the difficult questions
of the character and degree of armament which would justify
detention, His l\tlajesty's Government have made arrangements
for landing the guns of the JJ!I e~rrion, the· Ad.ria.tio having already
sailed before the orders re·ached her. In the case of the· latter
ship, the passenger list and cargo had 'p roved that she was proceeding to sea on ordinary comn1ereial businesf:l. These and other
papers relative to the case will be duly cmnmunicated to your
Department.
This action has been taken without prejudice to the· gen·eral
principle which His l\1ajesty's Government have enunciated and to
which they adhere. (Ibid. p. 231.)

The British position vvas further set forth In Inemoranda. of September 9, 1914:
A merchant vessel armed purely for self-defence· is therefore
entitled under international law to enjoy the· status of a peaceful trading ship in neutral ports and His Majesty's Governn1ent
do not ask for better treatment for British n1erehant ships in
this respect than n1igh t be accorded to those of other Powers.
They consider that only those merchant ships which are intended
for use as cruisers should be treated as ships of war and that
the questions whether a particular ship carrying an ar1nament
is intended for offensive or defensive action 1nust be decided by
the simple criterion whether she· is engaged in ordinary commerce and embarking cargo and passengers in the ordinary way.
If so, there is no rule in international law that would justify
such vessel even if armed being treated otherwise than as a
peaceful trader.

MEMORANDUM, SEPTEMBER 19, 1914
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In urging this. view upon the consideration of the United States
·G overnment the' British Ambassador is instructed to state· that it
is be1ieved that Gennan n1erchant vessels. with offensive annament
have escaped from A1nerican ports, especially fron1 ports in South
America to prey upon British c01nmerce in spite· of all the precautions taken. German cruisers in the· Atlantic continue· by one
n1eans or another to obtain ample! supplies of coal shipped to them
fron1 neutral ports, and if the United States Government take· the
view that British merchant vessels which are bona fide· engaged
in com1nerce and carry guns at the stern only are not pennitted
purely defensive arma1nent, unavoidable injury may ensue to
British interests and indirectly also· to United States trade which
will be deplorable. (Ibid. p. 233.)

M em.ora1ndwn~ of S'tatt e D'eparrt1ne11:.t, Septe·1nber 19,
191.1;.-The attitude o:f. the Department of State Yvas
made kno·wn in a memorandum aimed to set forth physical bases for determination of the intent of arnnng merchant vessels.
THE STATUS OF ARMED MERCHANT VE:SSELS

A

A n1erchant vessel of belligerent nationality 1nay carTy a n annament and ammunition for the sole purpose of defense without
acquiring the characte·r of a ship of w.ar.
B

'.rhe presence of an arn1ament and ammunition on board a merchant vessel creates a presumption that the ar1na1nent is for
offensive purposes, but the owners or agents may overcome this
presumption by evidence showing that the vessel carries ar1nament sole~y for defense.

c
Evidence necessary to establish the fact that the arma1nent is
solely for defense and will not be· used offensively, whether the
arma1nent be· mounted or stowed below, must be presented in each
case independently at an official investigation. The result of the
investigation 1nust show conclusively that the ar1na1nent is not
intended for, .and will not be used in, offensive operations.
Indications that the armament will not be used offensively are:
1. That the caliber of the guns carried does not exceed six
inches.
2. That the guns and small arms carried are few h1 number .
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3. That no guns are mounted on the forward part of the vessel.
4. That the quantity of an1munition carried is small.
5. That the vessel is manned by its usual crew, and the officers
are the same as those on board before war was declared.
6. That the vessel intends to and actually does. clear for a port
lying in its usual trade route, or a port indicating its purpose to
continue in the same trade in which it was engaged before war
was declared.
7. That the vessel takes on board fuel and supplies sufficient
only to carry it to its port of destination, or the same quantity
substantially which it has been accustomed to take for a voyage
before· war was declared.
t
8. That the ca rgo of the· vessel consists of articles of commerce
unsuited for the use of a ship of war in operations . against an
enemy.
9. That the· vess2l carries passengers who are as a \vhole unfitted to enter the military or naval service of the belligerent
whose flag the vessel flies, or of any of its allies, and particularly
if the passenger list included women and children.
10. That the spee d of the ship is slow.
D

Port authorities, on the arrival in a port of the United States of
an armed vessel of belligerent nationality, clain1ing to be a merc,hant vessel, should ilnmediately investig.ate and report to ""\Vashington on the foregoing indications as to the· intended use of the
anntunent, in order that it may be· determined whether the evidence is sufficient to remove the presumption that the· vessel is,
and should be treated as, a ship of war. Clearance will not be
granted until authorized from "'\Vashington, and the master will
be so informed upon arrival.
E

The conversion of a 1nerchant vessel into a ship of war is a
question of fact which is to be established by direct or circumstantial e·vidence· of intention to use· the vessel as a ship of war.
(Ibid. p. 234.)

Gern1an a.ttitttde.-Mr. G~rard transmitted a note from
the Gern1an foreign office on October 15 'vhich referred
to the n1emorandum o:f September 19, 1914. This note
says:
It is a question whether or not ships thus armed should be
ad1nitted into ports of a neutral country at all. Such ships!
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in any event, should not receive any better treatment in neutral
ports than a regular warship, and should be subject as least to the
rules issued by neutral nations restricting the stay of a warship.
If the GoYernment of the United States considers that it fulfills
its duty as a neutral nation by confining th·e ad1nission of anned
merchant ships to such ships as are equipped for defensive
purposes only, it is pointed out that so far as determining the warlike character of a ship is concerned, the distinction between
the defensive and offensive is irrelevant. The destination of a
ship for use of any kind in war is conclusive, and restrictions
as to the extent of annament afford no guarantee that ships armed
for defensive purposes only will not be used for offensive purposes
under certain circumstances. (Ibid. p. 238.)

On November 7 the United States expressed its dissent
from the German point. of view, reaffirmed the principles of the memorandum of September 19 and expressed
"disapprobation of a practice which compelled it to pass
upon a vessel's intended use " and further stated :
As a result of these representations no merchant vessel with
armaments have visited the ports of the United States. since the
10th of September. In fact fr01n the beginning of the European .
war but two anned private vessels have entered or cleared from
ports of this country and as to these vessels their character as
merchant vessels was conclusively established.
Please bring the foregoing to the attention of the German
Government and in doing . so express the hope that they will also
prevent their 1nerchant vessels from entering the ports of the
United States carrying annaments even for defensive purposes
though they may possess the right to do so by the rules of international law. (Ibid. p. 239.)

Pr'oposaZs of Department of St(JJte,, J am;ua!NJ 18, 1916.The treatment of armed merchant vessels became a
matter of discussion in Congress and elsewhere, and further correspondence. In an informal and confidential
letter the Department of State made certain propositions,
as follows:
In order to bring submarine warfare within the general rules
of international law. and the principle·s~ of humanity without
destroying its efficiency in the destruction of commerce, I believe
that a formula may be found which, though it may require slight
modifications of the practice generally followed by nations prior
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to the employment of submarines, will appeal to· the sense o:i
justice and fairness of a ll the belligerents in the present war.
Your excellency will understand that in seeking a formula or
rule of this nature I approach it of necess<ity from the· point of
vievY of a neutral, but I belie·v e that it will be equally efficacious
in preservjng the lives of all noncombatants on merchant' vessels
of belligerent nationality.
l\'Iy coininents on this subject .are predicated on the following
propositions :
1. A noncombatant has a right to traverse the high seas in
a merchant vess.el entitled to fly a belligerent flag and to rely
upon the observance of the rules of international law and principles of humanity if the vessel is approached by a naval vessel
of another belligerent.
2. A merchant vessel of enemy nationality should not be
attacked without being ordered to stop.
3. An ene·my merchant vessel when ordered to do so by a
belligerent submarine, should immediately stop.
4. Such vessel should not be attacked after being ordered to
stop unless it attempts to flee or to resist, and in case it ceases
to flee or resist, the attack should discontinue·.
5. In the event that it is impossible to place a prize crew
. on board of an enemy merchant vessel or convoy it into port, the
vessel 1nay be sunk, provided the crew and passengers have been
removed to a place of safety.
In complying with the foregoing propositions which, in my
opinion, e1nbody the principal rules, the strict observance of
which will insure the life of a noncombatant on a merchant
vessel which is intercepted by a submarine, I am not unmindful
of the obstacles which would be met by undersea craft as
commerce destroyers.
Prior to the year 1915 belligerent operations against enemy
c01nmerce on the high seas had been conducted with cruisers
carrying heavy armaments. Under those conditions international
law appeared to permit a merchant vessel to carry an annament
for defensive purposes without losing its character as a private
commercial vessel. This right seems to have been predicated on
the superior defensive strength of ships of' war, and the limitation
of armament to have been dependent on the fact that it could not
be used effectively in offense against enemy naval vessels, while it
could defend the merchantmen against the generally inferior
armament of piratical ships and privateers.
The use of the submarine, however, has changed these relations. Comparison of the defensive strength of a cruiser and a
submarine sho,vs that the latter, relying for protection on its
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power to submerge, is almost defenseless in point of construction. Even a merchant ship carrying a small caliber gun would
be able to use it effectively for offense against a submarine.
Moreover, pirates and sea rovers have been swept from the main
trade channels of the sea8, and privateering has been abolished.
Consequently, the placing of guns on me-rchantlnen at the present
day of submarine warfare can be explained only on the ground
of a purpose to render merchantmen superior in force to submarines and to prevent warning and visit and search by them.
Any arma1nent, therefore, on a merchant vessel would see1n to
have the character of an offensive armament.
If a sub1narine is required to stop and search a 1nerchant
vessel on the high seas and, in case it is found that she is of
enemy character and that conditions necessitate her destruction, to remove to a place of safety all persons on board, it
would not seem just or reasonable that the submarine should be
compelled, while complying with these requirements, to expose
itself to almost certain destruction by the guns on board the
merchant vessel.
It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and reciprocally
just arrangement if it could be agreed by the opposing belligerents
that submarines should be caused to adhere strictly to the rules
of international law in the matter of stopping and searching
merchant vessels, determining their belligerent nationality, and
re1noving the crews and passengers to places of safety before
sinking the vessels as prizes of war, and that merchant vessels
of belligerent nationality should be prohibited and prevented from
carrying any armament whatsoever.
In presenting this formula as a basis for conditional declarations by the belligerent Governments, I do so in the full conviction that your Government will consider primarily the humane
purpose of saving the lives of innocent people rather than the
insistence upon a doubtful legal right which may be denied on
account of new conditions. (Spec. Sup. Am. Jour. Int. Law, vol.
10, Oct. 1916, p. 310.)

Replies.-A German note of February 10, 1916, with its
numerous exhibits aimed to support the conclusion that
under the circumstances of the existing hostilities "enemy
mercha~t1nen armed ·with guns no longer have any right
to be considered as peaceable vessels of commerce."
On March 23, 1916, after consulting the allied Qovernments the British Government communicated its views
on the letter of January 18, 1916, in a memorandum.
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This 1nen1orandum gave little attention to the propositions of the Secretary of State but enumerated cases in
·which it was c~aimed the enemy has disregarded the law.
The memorandum did say, ho·wever:
Upon peru~al of the personal letter addressed under date of
January 18th last, by the Honorable Secretary of State of the
United States to the Ambassador of England at Washington,
the Governn1ent of His Britannic Majesty could not but appreciate the lofty sentiments by which IVIr. Lansing was inspired
on sub1nitting to the countries concerned certain considerations
touching the defensive armament of merchant vessels. But the
enemy's lack of good faith, evidenced in too many instances
to permit of their being regarded as isolated acc:dents justifies
the most serious doubt as to the possibility of putting into
practice the suggestions thus formulated.
From a strictly legal standr}oint, it must be admitted that
the arming of merchant vessels for defense is their acknowledged
right. It was established in. some countries by long usage, in
other countries it was expressly sanctioned by the legislator,
such being the case in the United States, in particular.
It being so, it see1ns obv:ous1 that 'any request that a belligerent forego lawful means of protection from the enemy's unlawful attacks placPs, upon him, whoever he may be, who
formulates the proposition, the duty and responsibility of compelling that enemy to desist from such attacks, for the said
enemy would otherwise be encouraged rather to persist in that
course. Now the suggestions above referred to do not provide
any immediately efficacious sanction. (Spec. Sup. Am. Jour. Int.
Law, vol. 10, Oct. 1916, p. 336.)

And later in the sa1ne mernorandu1n Great Britain
after imputing faithlessness to Germany as well as lawlessness, says :
At the end of his letter, the Honorable Secretary of State hypothetically considered the possibility of eventual decisions under
which armed merchant vessels might be treated as .auxiliary
cruisers.
It is His Britannic Majesty's Government's conviction that thPrealization of such a hypothesis which would materially n1odify,
to Germany's advantage, the· statement of views published in this
respect by the American Government on September lH, 1914, can
not be given practical consideration by the American authorities.
Such a modification indeed would be inconsistent with the general prineiples of. neutrality as sanctioned in paragraphs 5· and 6
.
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of the preamble to the, 13th ' convention of The Hague concerning
maritime neutrality. Moreover the result would be contrary to
the stipulations, of the 7th convention of The, Hague concerning
the transformation of merchant vessels into warships. Finally
if armed merchant vessels were to be treated as. auxiliary cruisers, the~r would possess. the' right of making prizes, and this would
n1ean the revival of privatee·ring. (Ibid. p. 337.)

The Secretary of State replied, diplomatically statipg
that it becomes his dvty to accept the reply of the Entente
Governments "as final, and in the spirit in which they
have made it."
Arn~e'rican memora.ndu1i~, Ma-rch 25, 191,6.-0n March
25, 1.916, a memorandum prepared by the direction of
the President, but unsigned, though issued by the Department of State, vvas made public as a statement of the
" Government's attitude" on the status of armed merchant vessels. This memorandun1 considered the status
of an arn1ed merchant vessel fro1n the point of vie'v of
the "neutral V\Then the vessel enters its ports " and from
the point of vie"r of " an ene1ny when the vessel is on the
high seas." A1nong other state1nents in this: memorandun1 are the following:
(1) It is necessary for a neutral Goyer1unent to deterrnine, the

status of an armed n1erchant vessel of belligerent nationality
which enters its jurisdiction, _in order that the Government may
protect itself from responsibility for the_ destruction of life and
property by pe1·mitting its ports to be us~d as bases of hostile
operations by belligerent warships.
( 2) If the vessel carries a conlmis.sion or orders issued by a
belligerent Government and directing it under penalty to conduct
aggressive operations, or if it is conclusively sho\vn to· have conducted such operations, it should be regarded and treated as· a
warship.
( 3) If sufficient evidence is wanting, a neutral Governmen't,
in order to safeguard itself frmn liability for failure to preserve
it~ i1eutrality, 1nay reasonably presu1ne frcnn' the facts the sta'ttts
of an anned merchant vessel which frequents its ,-vaters. There is
no settled rule of internationai law as to the sufficiency 'of evidence to establish such presumption. As a result a' Governn1ent
must decide for itself t'he si1fficiency of the ·evidence which it
requires to deterrniue the character o{ the vessel. ' ·For the guid1802-29--7
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ance of its port officers and other officials a neutral Government
111ay therefore declare a st~ndard of evidence, but such standard
n1ay be changed on account of the general conditions of na~al ..wa_r
fare or 1nodified on account of the circun1stances of a particular
case. These changes and 1nodifications 1nay be made at any thne
during the progress of the war, ~ince th~ determination of the
status of an armed 1nerchant vessel in neutral waters 1nay affect
the liability of a neutral Govenunent. * * *
The status of an anned n1erchant vessel as a warship in neutral
waters 1nay be determined, in the absence -of documentary proof or
conclusive eyidence of previous aggressive conduct, by presumption
derived from all the circumstances of the case. * * *
( 1) It appears to be the established rule of international law
that ·warships of a belligerent n1ay enter neutral ports and accept
limited hospitality there upon condition that they leave, as a rule,
within 24 hours after their arrival.
(2) Belligerent warships are also entitled. to take on fuel once
in three Inonths in ports of a neutral country.
(3) As a n1ode of enforcing these rules a neutral has the right
to cause belligerent warshi11s f~liling to comply with the1n, together,
·w ith their officers and cr~ws, to be interned during the remainder
of the war.
( 4) iVIerchantmen of bPllige1·ent nationality, armed only for purposes of protection against the enemy, are entitled to enter and
leave neutral ])Oits ·without hindrance ~n .the course o~ legitimate
trade.
·
·
~
· , ~ .··· - ".- ·( 5) Armed merchantmen of belligerent nationality under a
commission or orders of their Government to use, under penalty,
their annament for aggressiYe purposes, or mercbanhnen which,
without such conunission or orders, have used their annaments
for aggressiYe purpo~~s, are not ~ntitled to the same hospitality
in neutral }JOrts as peaceable anned 1nerchantn1en. (Spec. Sup.
Am. Jour. Int. Law, vol. 10, pp: 367, 369.) ·

The 1ne1norandum later refers to the status of anned
1nerchant _vessels on the high seas, entnnerating various
relations. The memorandtun states:
(11) A n1erchantn1an entitlecJ to exercise the right of selfprotection n1ay do so when certain of attack by an enemy warship, otherwise the exercise of the right would be so restricted
as to render it ineffectual. Tl~ere is a distinct difference, however, between the exercise of the right of self-protection and the
act of cruising the seas in an armed yessel for the purpose of
attacking ene1ny naYal vessels.
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(12) In ihe event that merchant ships of belligerent nationality
are arn1ed and under commission or orders to attack in all circumstances certain classes of enemy naval vessels for the purpos~ of ·destroying them, and are entitled to receive priz~ money
for such service from their Government or are liable to ~
penalty for failure to obey the orders given, such merchant ships
lose their status as peaceable merchant ships and are to a
limited extent incorporated in the naval forces of their Government, even though it is not their sole occupation to conduct hostile
operations.
(13) A vessel engaged intermittently in commerce and under a
commission or orders of its Government imposing a penalty, in
punming and attacking enemy naval craft, possesses a status
tainted with a hostile purpose which it can now throw aside or
assume at \Viii. It should, therefore, be considered as an armed
public vessel and receive the treatment of a warship by an enemy
and by neutrals. Any person taking passage on such a vessel
can not expect ilnmunity other than that accorded persons who
are on board a warship. A private vessel, engaged in seeking
enemy naval craft, without such a commission or orders from
its Government, stands in a relation to the enemy similar to
that of a civilian who fires upon the organized 1nilitary forces of
a belligerent, and is entitled to no more considerate treatment.
(Ibid. p. 3'?1.)

This n1en1orandum apparently envisages two classes
of armed merchant vessels, namely "peaceable armed
merchantmen" and "warlike armed merchantmen." As
to evidence as to character an earlier paragraph had said:
(3) A presumption based solely on the presence of an armanlent on a merchant vessel of an enemy is not a sufficient reason
for a belligerent to declare it to be a warship and proceed to
attack it without regard to the rights of the persons on board.
Conclusive evidence of a purpose to use the armament for aggression is essential. Consequently an armament which a neutral
Government, seeking to perform its neutral .duties, may presume
to be intended for aggression, 1night in fact on the high seas be
used solely for protection. A neutral Gover1unent has no opportunity to deter1nine the purpose of an armament on a merchant
vessel unless there is evidence in the ship~s 11apers or other proof
as to. its 11revious usc, so that the Government is justified in substituting an arbitnu:y rule of presumption in arriving at the
status of the Inerchant ve:ssel. On the other hand, a belligerent .
warship can on the high seas test by actual experience the
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IJUrpose of an arman1ent on an enemy merchant vessel, and so
determine by direct evidence the statt"s of the vessel. (Ibid.
p. 368.)

The application of such principles for determining
status as those mentioned in paragraph (12) above ·would
prove difficult if not impossible to establish, e. g., "orders
to attack in all circumstances" would rarely be given.
So1ne states no longer give prize money and this is not
given for destruction of naval vessels.
This memorandum particularly shows the need of some ·
definite and 'veil-prepared statement as to n1erchant vessels in time of war.
Professor' Hyde's opin,i on on United States 1ne1norand1t1n of M axrch 135, 1916.- ·
Apart from any question respecting the applicability of the
foregoing declaration to the special conditions confronting the
United States in March, 1916, the author, with greatest deference
for the opinion of those responsible for the men1orandun1, confesses his inability to accept it as a state1nent of international
law for the following reasons:
(a.) It fails to heed the fact that the hn1nunity of merchant
vessels from attack at sight grew out of their hnpotency to endanger the safety of public armed vessels of an enemy, and
that 1naritime, States have never acquiesced in a principle that
a 1nerchant vessel so arn1ed as to be capable of destroying a
vessel of war of a ny kind should enjoy im1nunity frmn attack
at sight, at least when encountering an enen1y cruiser of inferior
defensive strength.
(b) That an armed merchantman 1nay retain its status as a
private· ship is n ot de·c isive of the treatment to which it may be
subjected. The potentiality and special adaptability of the vessel
to engage in hostile operations fraught with danger to the· safety
of an enemy vessel of war, rather than the· designs or purposes
of those in control of the former, however indicative of its
character, have been and should be deemed the test of the right
of the opposing belligerent to attack it at sight. In view of this
fact the lawful presence on board the anned merchantman of neutral persons or property can not give· rise to a duty towards the
ship not otherwise apparent; · Every occupant thereof n1ust · be
held to assume that the e1iemy will use every lawful but no
11Iilawful means to subject the vessel to control or destroy it.
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(c) To test the propriety of an attack at sight by the existence
of conclusive proof of the aggressive purpose of the merchantulan places an unreasonable burden on a vessel of war of an unprotected type, whether a surface or undersea craft, for no evidence of the requisite purposes of the Ine·rchantman may be
in fact obtainable until the vessel of war encountering the
fonner becomes itself the object of attack. The mere pursuit of
the n1erchantman, prior to any signal 1nade to i.t, 1nay cause the
vessel to attack the pursuN· as soon as it gets within range.
vVhat constitutes, 1noreover, an act by way of defense 1nu~t
always remain a matter of uncertainty. The possession of substantial armmnent encourages the possessor to assert or clahn
that it acts defensively whenever it opens fire. Thus in practice
the distinction between the, offensive and defensive use of· annament disappears, for the armed 1nerchantman is disposed to
exercise its po\Yer whenever it can safely do so. To presun1e,
therefore, that such a vessel has. a "peaceable character," on
the supposition that it will not when occasion offers open fire
oi1 vulnerable vessels of war of the enen1y is to ignore an inference fairly deducible fr01n the conduct of vessels equipped with
effective n1eans of conunitting hostile acts. (2 Hyde, International Law, p. 469.)

British Adn1iT·a.Zty opzn~on-, 1916.-0n December 21 ,
1916, Sir Ed-ward Carson, First Lord of the Ad1niralty,
in reply to a question in the House of Co1nn1ons said :
His l\1ajesty's Govenunent can not admit any distinction
between the rights of unanned n1erchant ships and those anned
for defensive purposes. It is no doubt the aim of the German
Govern1nent to confuse defensive and offensive action with the
object of inducing neutrals to treat defensively armed vessels
as if they were 1nen-of-war. Our position is perfectly clearthat a merchant sean1an enjoys the ilnme1norial right of defending his vessel against attack or visit or search by the enemy by
any means in his power, but that he n1ust not seek out an ene1ny
in order to attack him-that being a function reserved to conlmissioned men-of-war. So far as I an1 aware, all neutral Po·w ers,
without exception, take the same• view, which is clearly indicatel1
in the Prize Regulations of the Gennans then1selves. I have
confined n1yself to stating the general position; but 1ny hon.
Friend may rest assured that the Departments concerned are
devoting continuous. attention to all question connected w:th
the theory and practice of defpnsive armament. (Parlianientary
Debates, H. C. 5 series, LXXXVIII, p. 1627.)
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Netherlands position on arm.ed merohant vessels.-The
status of armed merchant vessels in Dutch ports became
a subject of much corr~spondence in 1914 and 1915. In
a telegram to the British Legation at The Hague on
August 8, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said:
You should lose no time in explaining to Netherlands GovernInent that British armed merchant vessels are armed solely for
purposes of defence, in case they raise any question as to their
position. Existing rules of international law grant the right of
defence to all merchant vessels when attacked. There can be no
right on the !)art of a neutral Government to order the internment
of British-owneu merchant vessels, nor to require them before putting to sea to land their gun8, because the, duty of such neutral
Government to order the .immediate departure or internment of
belligerent vessels is limited to actual and potential warships, and
as Gre:a t Britain does not admit that any Power has the right to
convert merchant vessels into warships on the high seas, British
merchant vessels that are in foreign ports cannot be so converted.
As German rules permit German merchant vessels to be converted on the high s.eas, we maintain o~r claim to have them interned unless the neutral Government are prepared to assume responsibility for a binding assurance that no such conversion shall
take place. (Parliamentary Papers, Misc. No. 14 [19'17], p. 1.)

r.rhe Dutch proclamation of neutrality had prohibited
entrance within Dutch jurisdiction of " warships of a
belligerent and vessels of a belligerent assimilated to
warships" and in a communication of April 7, 1915, to
the British minister, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs said:
As far as Dutch territory in Europe is concerned, this rule admits of no exception, except in the case of damage or by reason
of s,tress of weather.

In replying to this Sir Edward Grey communicated a
memorandum by P_rof. A. Pearce Higgins:
As there appears to be some doubt as to the legal status of
merchant ships which are armed in self-defence, the following
statement may be of interest and assistance to shipowners and
shipmasters : The practice of arming ships in self-defence is a very old one.
There are· Royal Proclamations from the time of Charles I order-
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ing merchant ships to be armed, and to do their utmost to d·efend
themselves against enemy attacks. During the Napoleonic wars
the Prize Courts of Great Britain and the United States recognised that a belligerent Iuerchant ship had a perfect right to .ar1n
in her own defence (the Catherine Elvzabeth (British) and the
Nere·ide (United States)). The i·ight of a belligerent Inerchant
ship to carry arms and to resist capture is definitely and clearly
laid down in lJoth of the cases just cited.
Chief Justice Marshall, of the United States, in the case of the
Neroide, said: "It is true that on her passage she had a right• to
defend herself, and defended herself, and n1ight have captured an
assailing vessel."
·In Inodern tiines the right of resistance of 1nerchant vessels
is also recognised by the United States Naval War Code, which
was published in 1900, by the Italian Code for the M·ercantile
:Marine, 1877, and by the Russian Prize Regulations, 1895.
"\Vriters of weight and authority in Great Britain, the United
States, Italy, France, Belgium, and Holland also recognise this
right. The late Dr. F. Perels, who was at one time legal adviser
to the German AdmiraJty, quotes with approval article 10 of
the United States Naval War Code, which states: "The personnel
of tnerchant vessels of an enemy, ·who in self-defence and in protection of the vessel placed in their charge resist an attack, are
entitled to the status of prisoners of war."
The most recent authoritative pronouncement on this subject comes from the Institute of International Law, a body composed of international lawyers of all nationalities.. This learned
society, which meets generally once a year 'in different countries
to discuss and make proposals. on points. of International Law, at
its meeting in 1913 at Oxford prepared a Manual of the Laws o'I
Naval Warfare which was adopted with unanimity. Article 12
of this Manual, which is in French, may be translated as. follows.:
"Privateering is. forbidden. Except under the conditions
specified in article 5 and the following articles, public and private
ships and their crews may not take part in hostilities against
the enemy.
" Both are, however, a.llowed to employ force to defend th~m
selves against tho attack of an enemy skip."

The crews of enemy merchant ships. have for centuries been
liable to be treated as prisoners of war whether they resisted
capture or not.
Crews who forcibly resist visit and capture, can not, if they
are unsuccessful, claim to be released; they remain prisoners
of war.
Defensively armed merchant ships must not assume the offensivp agains.t enemy merchant ships. They are armed for defence,
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not for attack, but if they are attacked and they are able successfully to repel the attack and even to capture their assailant,
such capture is valid ; the captured ship is good prize as between
the belligerents.
There is smne authority, as in the Italian Code and Russian
Prize Regulations, for saying that an armed merchant ship has
a right to go to the assistance of ·other national or allied vessels
attacked, and assist then1 in Inaking a capture. But this is
b;y . no Inean:S such a well-established rule as the rule of selfdefence. It will in nearly all cases be 1nuch n1ore hnportant
for a defensively armed ship to get safely away with her cargo
than to go to the assistance of another merchant ship, for .in
this case the safety of both may be placed in jeopardy.
The position of the passengers on a defensively armed ship, if
no resistance· is made, is the .same as if they were on an unarmed
1nerchant ship. If, however, the armed ship resists, they will,
naturally, have to take their chances of injury or death. Unless
they take part in the resistance, they are not liable, if the ship
is captured, to be taken prisonet·s, merely because of the fact of
resistance having been offered· by the ship. (Ibid. p. 3.)

vVith the. memorandunl \Vas a pamphlet by Professor
Higgins on the sa1ne. subject. On J nly 31, 1915, M. Loudon, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied:
In his note of the· 12th June last Mr. Chilton returned to this
subject. [Admission of arn1ed 1nerchant vessels.] He specially
called 1ny attention to· the· rule of international law which per1nits
bellige-rent merchant vessels to defend the·mselves against enemy
warships, and. he was good ·e nough to add to his note· a n1emorandun1 and a pamphlet in support- of his observations.
I have read these documents with 1nuch interest. However,
there see1ns to n1e to be no connection between the· above-mentioned
rule and the· que·stion 'vhether the acbnission into neutral ports of
a certain category of vessels of belligerent nationality is or is not
co1npatible with the observance of a strict neutrality. This l-atter
question lies within the proYince: of the law· of neutrality. On
the other hand, the rule inYo,kec1 by 31r. Chilton is part of the law
of war.
A belligerent 1nerchant ve·ssel 'vhich fights to escape· capture or
destruction by an enen1y 'varship conuuits an act the· legitin1aey
of which is indeed unquestionable, but which is none the less an
act of war. (Ibid. p. 5.)

The British Govern1nent dissented fron1 this vie\Y and
rnade an elaborate argtunent against the ~ether lands po-
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sition involving state1nents of certain consequences that
might follovv. 1\!Iany notes \Yere exchanged, but the
Nether lands n1aintained the right to exclude arine(l merchant vessels.
·
Offlc'l·az state?nents.-Governiuents of different States
Inacle kno\vn their attitude upon ar1ned 1nerchant vessels
during the
oriel ''T~u-. usually by do1nestic regulations
and so1netin1es in a 1nore :fonnal Inanner. 'There \Vas
Inuch diversity and indefiniteness in the3e docu1nents.
The Argentine Republic took action e·ai·ly in the \\r orld
Y\Tar, August 16, 19t-t forbidding foreign Inerchant vessels to arm as auxiliary vessels o:f \Var and requiring such
merchant yessels as \vere in port to declare \Vithjn 24
hours if having auxiliary statns. These \vere to be ·
treated as Yessels of ·war.
General Orders No. 133 of the Argentine navy departrnent, _A_ugust 17, 1914~ provided:

''r

(c) Foreign 1nerchanbnen ·which \Vithout being officially declared as auxiliary cruiser~ neYertheless carry cannon for their
defense shall not 1nake use of the1n in waters under State, control, and the, Govennnent reserves to itself in case of their having
served as auxiliary cruisers the right to treat them as such when
they return to waters under its jurisdiction.
As the, legal status of ships of war is not conceded these vessels, any hostile act of theirs in \Vaters under the jurisdiction of
the State shall be considered as an act in open violation of the
law of the country.
(d) The general prefecture ef ports shall take note of all
foreign merchanhnen which 1na.:r have cannon for defense, either
1nounted or unn1ounted. or en1placements for cannon, to the end
that they be e·specially watched.
(e) Anwng the foreign 1nerchanhnen armed with cannon there
are some that carry their cannon on the stern only, and with a
very restricted firing sector; in other words, they are guns which
1nay fire only directly astern. It 1nay well be conceded that tha
sole object of these guns is the defense of the boat. Other vessels
carry then1 in the bow and on both sides-that is to say, in
offensive sectors. EYen though the technical requisites for considering these boat$ as auxiliary cruisers do not appear, it is
nevertheless eYident that ~heir armament suggests their purpose.
l-Ienee supervision in sueh cases ~hall be especially rigorous.
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(f) It is to be borne in mind that by virtue of the prov1s10ns
of article 31 in the r'egula tions of the port of the capital and of
La Plata no boat is to enter them with explosives aboard. Consequently if any merchantmen armed with cannon carry powder
on board they are not to be per1nitted to enter the harbor before
disembarking a1nm uni tions.
.(g) The general prefecture of ports vdll take necessary Ineasnres to prevent the der1arture of war vessels, auxiliary cruisers,
or even armed 1nerchanhnen until 24 hours after the departure
from the sanw harbor of any other armed or unannecl 1nerchant1nan flying the flag of a hostile country.
(h) 'Var vessels and ftuxiliary cruisers flying belligerent colors
whose stop in territorial waters is lhnited to 24 hours shall not
cast anchor in the1n except for reasons of exceptional urgency
( caso de fuerza mayor) .
Armed 1nerchantmen wh!ch it is suspected may be conve~ted
into auxiliary cruisers shall be watched with particular care,
so that they 1nay not be able to thwart the precautions established for the protection of steamers departing each in the order
of its turn by casting anchor with hostile intent within the
t erritorial waters. (1917 N. W. C. Int. Law Docs. p. 23.)

The Chilean rules of August 14, 1914, issued by the
Mi?-ister of Foreign Relations, provided that:
1. All vessels at anchor in Chilean ports or which navigate
in the national territorial waters may be obliged to submit to .
the inspection of their papers by the Chilean authorities, which
1nay, whenever they deem it necessary, according to the rules
which are hereafter specified, proceed anew to the inspection of
the vessel, of its passengers, of its cargo, and of its documents.
In consequence, the clearance of any vessel can not be authorized,
whatever its cargo and whatever •its destination, until the ship has
presented complete manifests.
2. Permission to depart will be given to no merchant vessel
which has altered or tried to alter its . status, if there is reason
to believe that the vessel has intended to transform itself into
an auxiliary cruiser or an arn1ed vessel in any degree whatsoever.
The following acts will be considered as furnishing a presumption of change of status:
(a) To alter the location or position of guns which are on board
the vessel at the time of its arrival; to change the color, the rigging, or the equipment of the vessel in a 1nanner to create a
presumption that this change has an object relating to n1ilitary
operations ;
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(b) To embark guns, arms, or munitions in the circumstances
which indicate adaptation of the vessel to military ends;
(c) To refuse to take on board passengers when the vessel
possesses suitable accommodation for them ;
(d) To load abnormal quantities of coal.
3. The maritime authorities should demand of foreign consuls
who vise the papers of vessels a declaration in reference to the
chara.c ter of the vessel, stating whether it is a question of a merchant vessel engaged in the transport of merchandise and pa-ssengers, or whether it forms a part of the armed forces of the nation
to which it belongs. In this latter case the vessel will be warned
that it must depart after twenty-four hours and with coal only
sufficient for the journey to the nearest port of its nation. (1916
N. W. C. Int. Law Topics, p. 16.)

In publishing these rules the. Minister of Foreign
Affairs stated " The Government of the United States
has issued similar r'egulations."
·A note :from the same office on March 15, 1915, involves
some further propositions which were due to the British
query as to whether auxiliary naval vessels might resume
their merchant-vessel status.
·
The Government of Chile desires to settle the question suggested by the note above indicated according to the attitude
of strict neutrality adopted by it since the beginning of the war
and also in conforn1ity with the general convenience of the
American Continent, since the great European conflict has
demonstrated in an evident manner that the international rules
should in the future take into consideration the particular
conditions of this hemisphere.
Inspired by this idea, the Chilean Government sees no inconvenience in admitting into the ports and jurisdictional waters
of Chile and in treating in all respects as merchant vessels, vessels which have been auxiliaries of the fleet of one of the belligerent States, when the said vessels fulfill the following conditions:
1. That. the auxiliary vessel has not violated Chilean neutrality;
2. That the reconversion took place in the ports or jurisdictional :waters of the country to which the vessel belongs or in
the ports of' its allies ;
3. That this was effective: that is to say, that the vessel
neither in its crew· nor in its equip1nent gives evidence .that it
can be of service to the armed fleet of its country in the capacity
of an auxiliary, as it was formerly;
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4. That the Government of the country to which the vessel
belongs communicates to all interested nations, and in particular
to neutrals, the na1nes of auxiliary vessels which have lost this
status to restune that of merchant vessels; and
·5. That the sa1ne Govern1nent give its word that the said vessels are not in the future intended for the service of the armed
fleet hi ?the capacity of auxiliaries; (Ibid. p. 28.)

L-ater another communication states:
The Chilean ports will receive 1nerchant vessels armed for
defense when the respective Govenunents previously communicate
to us the name of the vessel which travels under these conditions
and also the route, roll of crew, list of passengers, and cargo,
as well as the manage1nent and the arinainent of the vessel,
de1nonstrating that it is in reality a question of a merchant vessel which is not intended to carry on hostile acts nor to cooperate
r
in the 'varlike operations of' ene1ny fleets.
If an armed 1nerch~nt vessel arrives without this previous
notice of the Governn1ent, it will be considered and treated as
.suspicious. If, violating their· declaration, these vessels engage in
operations of war against other 1nerchant vessels without defense
the;r will be forthwith considered and tr~ated as pirates, since the
Governn1ent of the country under whose flag they fly will have
fol'lnally declared their exclusively com1nercial character by not
incorporating then1 into its fleet of 'var. (Ibid. p. 31.)

Cuba, March 3, 1916, reproduced as a statement of its
policy the men1orandum issued by the United States September 19, 1914 (ante, p. 83).
There "\Vere differences in the regulations issued by
other countries. The methods of determining ·whether
an armed merchant vessel was to be treated as a vessel
of war or as a merchant vessel also varied at different
times in some states. There were also interpretations
which led to misunderstandings. Some, of these indicated
that it was as Mr. Churchill had predicted in 1913, "a
period of retrogression."
British emplan{J)tion, 1917.-That British armed merchant vessels would be liable in ports of the United States
under some of the principles set forth in the meinorandum of March 25, 1916, is evident from the state1nents
of Sir Ed,vard Carson and J\fr. Churchill in 1917.

BRI,TISH STATEMENTS, 191 7
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'Vinston Churchill, speaking on February 2, 1917,
before the House of Commons, said :
The object of putting guns on a tnerchant ship is to ccnnpel
the sub1narine to sub1nerge. If a tnerchant ship has no guns, a
submarine with a gun is able to destroy it at leisure by gunfire,
and we must remen1ber that on the surface subn1arines go nearly
twice as fast as they do under ·water. Therefore, the effect of
putting guns on a n1erchant ship is to drive the sub1narine toabandon the use of the gun, to lose its surface speed, and to fall
back on the n1uch slower speed under water and the use of the
torpedo. The torpedo, c01npared with the gun, is a weapon of
much n1ore lilnited application. The number of torpedoes which
can be constructed in a given time is itself subject to certain
lhnits. Any trained artillerist or naval gunner can hit 'vith a
gun, but to 1nake a subn1erged attack with a torpedo requires a
1nuch higher degree of skill and training. One of the things we
counted on to check the indefinite developn1ent of Gern1an sublnarine expansion was the difficulty of training crews. That
difficulty does not manifest itself as long as sub1narines are free to
USe the gun. but it Will Undoubtedly 111anifest itself When they are
driven back on the aln1ost exclusive use of the torpedo, by the fact
that the great 1najority of 1nerchant ships which they 1neet will
be effectively annell, and the result will be, or should be to a certain extent. that a very large proportion of torpedoes will be
wasted, because the difficulty of firing at a ship advancing with
accuracy is very great, and there is only a Yery limited arc
ahead of a ship fron1 which a torpedo can be discharged ·with
the certainty of getting hmne. Also the torpedo is easy to dodge,
and a shell is hnpossible to dodge. I thought it ·was right to explain in a fe·w simple words this 1natter which is bread and butter
to every family in this country. It is of the highest ilnportance
that the ships which are being built to replace existing tonnage!
·w hat ·we might call tonnage casualties, should possess a speed
superior to the speed of an ene1ny sub1narine sub1nerged. (Parliainentary Debates, 5 s., H. C., XC, p. 1380.)

The parliarnentary seeretnr_v to the Ministry of Shipping Control indicated his assent and Mr. Churchill
continued:
I an1 very glad 1ny hon. Ifrieud assents to that, because it is
of t11e utmost importnnee that the Ad1niralty's view on a ,matter
of that kind should bJ fully rPalised and adopted by the Department of Shipping Coutrol. Anothee poiut, ·which is of gl'eat
importance, is that not only :-;hould guns be 11ut on the ships, but
there should he at lC'ast one good gun-layPr on earh. I dare sny
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that is becoming the case now, but it was not the case until a
short time ago, and many cases have been brought to notice of
vessels which carried guns but carried no man really competent
to direct the shot to its objective. (Ibid. p. 1381.)

While under the guise o£ retaliation a belligerent might
arm and use its merchant vessels £or any purpose ,it saw fit
as regards its enemy, such appeal to the principle o£
retaliation would give these ve~sels no special rights in
neutral ports.
German war-zone note, January 31, 1917.-A:fter an explanatory statement the German ambassador presented to
the United States a memorandum on January 31, 1917,
recounting what Germany conceived to be disregard by
the Allies o:f rules o£ international law and stating that:
Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal measures of her enemies by forcibly preventing after February 1, 1917,
in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the Eastern
Mediterranean all navigation, that of n~utrals included, from and
to England and from and to France, etc. etc. All ships met within
that zone will be sunk. (Spec. Sup. Am. Jour. Int~ Law, vol.11,
1917, p. 333.)

Breaking of diplomatic relations, Februarry 3, 1917.In reply the Secretary o:f State reviewed the prior action
of Germany and the promises which the United States
understood had been made in regard to the conduct o:f
submarine warfare and concluded:
In view of this declaration, which withdraws suddenly and
without prior intimation the solemn assurances given in the
Imperial Government's note of May 4, 1916, this Government has
no alternative consistent with the dignity and honor of the
United States but to take the course which it explicitly announced in its note of April 18, 1916, it would take in the
event that the Imperial Government did not declare and effect
an abandonment of the methods of submarine warfare then employed a nd to which the Imperial Government now purpose
again to resort.
The President has, therefore, directed me to announce to Your
Excellency that all diplomatic relations between the United States
:a nd the German Empire are severed, and that the American ainbassador .at Berlin will be immediately withdrawn, and in accordance with such announcement to deliver to Your Excellency your
passports. (Ibid. p. 337.)

NEUTRAL PROBLEMS
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.r1 merioan attituck afte?~ breaking diplomatic relations.-On February 3, 1917, the President explained in
an address to Congress the reasons for the breaking of
diplomatic relations with Germany. Negotiations were
continued through the Swiss minister.
A bill was introduced, February 27, 1917, to authorize
the President to provide for the arming of f\.-merican
merchant vessels "with defensive arms fore and aft, and
also with the necessary ammunition and means of making use of them." On March 12 announcement was made
to the diplomatic representatives in Washington that the
Government had "determined to place upon all American merchant vessels sailing through the barred areas an
armed guard for the protection of the vessels and the
lives of the persons on board." (Ibid. p. 345.)
After February 27 the United States also admitted to its
ports vessels of the allied. belligerents armed fore and aft.
Other neutral problems.-The neutral may find difficulty in determining many questions i£ armed merchant
vessels are to be allowed. Such means of determination
as were accepted in the vVorld War are without general
sanction. I-Iow far might a neutral without liability
allo'v an armed merchant vessel under the merchant flag
of a belligerent state to take .on war supplies, mal~e repairs, etc., when that state advocates conversion and
reconversion on the high seas without limitation?
Article XIV of the treaty limiting naval armament,
February 6, 1922, is as follows:
No preparations shall be made in rnerchant ships in time· of
peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose
of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the· necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not e·xceeding
6 inch ( 152 millimetres) calibre.

There might be under terms of this situation vessels
adapted in accordance with Article XIV. Article XIV
has been thought by some to be a tacit sanction for the
arming of merchant vessels, but it should be observed
that this article provides in time of peace for strengthen-
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ing decks "for fhe purpose of conyerting such ships into
vessels of 'var " and that no other preparations for this
purpose shall be made. · It is apparently assu1necl that in
ti1ne of 'var Inerchant vessels ~Yfill be converted and that
in time of peace decks 'vill be stiffened for that purpose.
If in ti1ne of peace a 1nerchant vessel has had its
decks stiffened and after the outbreak of 'var' carries
guns not exceeding 6-inch caliber, can it claim to be a
1nerchant vessel ar1necl only for de.fense. or 'vould any
arma1nent on such a Yessel put it in the class of a ·war
vessel? ~1ay it be 1naintained that the stiffening of
decks 'vas not for the purpose of conversion into vessels
of war but for installing- guns for defense :?
The 'vording of Article XI\T does not neeessarily preclude such an interpretation as the latter, and the French
translation~ 'vhich is eqnally official, 'vould possibly pern1it such an interpretation.
r_rhe opposing belligerent lliight~ ho,yeyer, Inaintain
that deck strengthening in tin1e of peace 'vas for the purpose of converting the vessel into a vessel of ,.rar, and that
therefore the n1ounting of a gnn of any caliber on such a
vessel "~as a. fulfilhnent of the purpose 1naking the vessel
a: ves~el of 'var so far as belligerent relations 'vere coneerned. A neutraln1ight n1aintain the san1e position.
Probably the very Yc~se>ls \rhich n1ight have had
deck strengthening 'vonl<l be the ve3sels 'vhich, reinaining in the 1nerchant ser\~ice, 'vonld arn1 for defense, and
it thns anned 'voulct nndc)r the belligerent ene1ny's intr.rpretation, becon1e liable as yessels of 'var. The arguITient 'vould be briefly that strengthening decks is to
pre pare for conversio11 into a vessel of 'var. Putting
guns on board is evidence of conversion; therefore a vessel having guns on decks stiffened in ,tin1e of peace' is a
v·essel of 'var. The belligerent can not take the chance
of being sunk while 1naking an investigation to fi1Hl ont
"\vhether such a vessel has been legally converted into a
vessel of war in a home port in accord 'vith the rules of
n Hague convention.

CONCLUSION
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'!''he granting of subsidies and special franchises , the
provisions for taking over into public service in titne of
'Yar, and other state acts con1.plicate the ..establishing of
a "\vell-definecl basis for neutral jndg1nent of the status
of merchant vessels in "\var tin1e. 'rhe public o'vnersh]p
of 1nerchant vessels 'vith varying degrees of public
control adds fnrt her difficulties.
C'onclusion.-'l''here have been 'vide differences of
opinion and practice in regard to the treahnent of ar1necl
1nerchant vessels.
It can not be said that there is now agreement as to the laws
in regard to ar1necl n1erchan t vessels, but under Inodern conditions
the ancient reascms for arming do not exist, as piracy and
sea thieYing of early clays no longer exist. Anning Inight be
to Ineet a merchant vessel of the enemy similarly annecl, as was
the British contentiou just before and iu the early part of the
'Yorld 'Yar. Soon, ho\YeYer, it was apparent fron1 documents
and practice that an armed merchant yessel's n1aster would use
his arms against what he n1ight consider an inferior Yessel. For
:-;afety of 11ersonnt'l and pro11erty, a n1erchaut yessel should
rt:·nutin a peaceful ye~sel. A yessel of war should likewise
conduct .itself in accord \Yith the rules of \Yar, and should not be
put in 11eril by Ye~:-;els \Ylwse immunity and right to safety it
is under obligation to respect.
('Yilson, IIandbook of International Law, 2cl eel .. p. 30G.)

I.Jate state practice in o'vning and .operating 1nore or
less directly son1e of the 1nerchant 1narine under its flag
\'i'"oulcl seen1 to 1nake scnne of the early op~nions scarcely
.a pplicable to present conditions. These and 1nany other
reasons point to the desirability both :for beHigerents and
neutl'als of a clear detern1ination of the status o:f anned
Inerchant vessels in the ti1ne of 'var.
SOLUTION

Practice and opinion since 1914 afford son1e support
for the position of each neutral and for the protest of
each belligerent, but .the position of state C seen1s to be
ga1n1ng support. 'rhe 'vhole sit11ation sho,vs the, need
of clear deter1nina ti on of the status of ar1ned 1nerchnnt
Ycssels.
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